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Abstract 
 
The purpose of the paper is to examine the hypothesis that increased participation in global 
value chains (GVCs), such as assembly of imported parts for exports, leads to higher 
economic growth. The focus is particularly on the extent to which this holds for low-income 
countries, and the role that capability-building, i.e., the development of the national 
innovation system, plays for the possibility to benefit from GVCs. The analysis is based on 
evidence from 125 countries over the period 1997-2013. To analyse the issue a 
comprehensive framework that allows for the inclusion of a range of relevant factors, 
including GVC participation (measured by the foreign value added embodied in a country’s 
exports), is applied. The results suggest that countries that increase GVC participation do not 
grow faster than other countries, when other relevant factors are controlled for.  Small 
countries, and countries with low capabilities, appear to be particularly disadvantaged. 
 
Keywords: Global value chains, capability, national innovation system, economic 
development, economic growth. 
 
JEL codes: F43, O10, O30, O40, O57. 
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1. Introduction 
 
What explains the extent to which countries manage to exploit the worldwide pool of 
technological knowledge to their advantage? This has been a hotly contested issue in 
economic and development research for a long time. The so-called Washington Consensus, 
advocated by the World Bank and other international organizations, predicted that this would 
be easy as long as the country shied away from tampering with markets and practiced 
openness to trade and foreign investment. However, empirical research has found the 
evidence on this proposition to be rather mixed (Görg and Greenaway 2004, Fagerberg, 
Srholec and Verspagen 2010, Keller 2010).  
 
It was pointed out by several contributors to the debate that one explanation might be that 
successful exploitation of foreign knowledge crucially depends on the development of 
national “technological capability” (Kim 1997, Lall 1992) or “absorptive capacity” (Cohen 
and Levinthal 1990, Criscuolo and Narula 2008) within the framework of a “national 
innovation system” (Lundvall 1992, Nelson 1993). The emergence of the innovation-system 
approach has from the early 1990s onward led to a host of new research emphasizing the role 
of national capability-building in economic development (Fagerberg and Srholec 2008, 
Lundvall et al 2009). However, since national innovation systems are increasingly dependent 
on foreign sources of knowledge, it is also important to assess if, how and in what forms 
openness to various channels for transfer of foreign knowledge matters for economic 
development.  
 
One important strand of research on economic development has focused on how and to what 
extent foreign direct investment (FDI) by multinational firms contribute to economic growth 
in countries at different levels of development (Narula and Dunning 2010).  An important 
insight from this literature is that spillovers to host country firms require that those firms have 
a sufficient absorptive capacity and linkages with the foreign affiliates (Castellani and Zanfei 
2006, Narula 2014, Rojec and Knell 2017). Econometric studies at the country level also 
indicate that a positive impact of FDI is conditional on national capabilities and human 
resources (Borensztein, De Gregorio and Lee 1998, Xu 2000, Filippetti, Frenz and Ietto-
Gillies 2016).  
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A new stream of literature that emerged during the 1990s pointed out that the combination of 
the ICT revolution and innovations in transport technology had led to the development of 
new ways to produce and distribute goods and services globally (Sturgeon 2002) in the form 
of global value chains (GVCs) coordinated and led by multinational companies, so-called 
“lead firms” (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1994, Gereffi et al. 2005). It was argued that this 
might provide enterprises in developing countries with opportunities to upgrade 
technologically and in terms of functions through participating in such networks (Ernst and 
Kim 2002, Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark 2011, Gereffi 2014). Following this line of argument, 
international organizations, such as the World Bank, have recommended developing 
countries to increase their participation in GVCs in order to spur economic growth.1 
  
Much of the empirical research on GVCs has taken the form of case studies at the level of 
enterprises, geographical clusters or specific segments of vertically organised business 
activities.2 These studies have brought to light many examples of local firms in countries at 
different levels of development that have been able to upgrade products and processes in an 
interaction with lead firms in high income countries. However, moving from case studies to 
analyses of entire countries or the global economy as a whole is a challenging step that was 
for a long time hampered by lack of data on participation in GVCs at the national and global 
level. More recently, international agencies such as OECD and UNCTAD, as well as 
networks of researchers, have created data sets that in a better way than before account for 
trade in intermediate products (Timmer et al. 2015 and Eora 2016). These data may be used 
to illustrate the proliferation of GVCs (Koopman et al 2010, 2014, Timmer et al. 2014 and 
Foster‐McGregor et al 2015). 
  
The purpose of this paper is to examine the hypothesis that increased participation in GVCs, 
such as assembly of imported parts for exports, leads to higher economic growth. The focus 
                                                 
1 See for example the following programmatic statement on the World Bank’s website: “Participation in global 
value chains (GVCs), the international fragmentation of production, can lead to increased job creation and 
economic growth. The World Bank Group is helping developing countries catch the GVCs wave and realize the 
benefits GVCs can deliver”. (http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/global-value-chains, accessed on 11 April, 
2018. 
2 For a combination of macroeconomic and sectoral analysis in a specific region see Del Prete, Giovannetti and 
Marvasi (2017). 
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is particularly on the extent to which this holds for low-income countries, an issue that has 
received relatively little attention so far, often due to data limitations (Kummritz and Quast 
2016). Therefore, the present paper has placed emphasis on including as many low-income 
countries as possible, to some extent at the expense of richer data and availability of time 
series. To explore this issue, we apply a framework that allows for the inclusion of a range of 
relevant factors, including not only GVC participation3, but also other factors that may 
influence transfer and exploitation of knowledge and the development of the national 
innovation system.  
 
In section 2 we discuss how different forms of capability building and foreign sources of 
knowledge, including participation in GVCs, interact with the process of economic 
development. Based on the conclusions reached there the subsequent section 3 delves more 
deeply into the measurement of the various factors, including capabilities, participation in 
GVCs and other channels for foreign knowledge transfer, and explores the relationship with 
economic development. Section 4 of the paper considers, using regression analysis, the extent 
to which increased participation in GVCs, measured by foreign value added in a country’s 
exports, is associated with higher economic growth. The final section sums up the lessons 
from the study.  
  
In general, the results presented in this paper suggest that countries that increase their 
participation in GVCs, e.g., through assembly of imported parts for exports, do not grow 
faster than other countries, when other relevant factors are controlled for. Countries with low 
capabilities, i.e, weakly developed innovation systems, appear to be particularly 
disadvantaged. The same holds for small economies. However, it should be noted that due to 
the nature of the available data, the results should not be interpreted as proving causal 
relationships.  
 
                                                 
3 GVC participation is in this paper is measured as foreign (imported) value added embodied in a country’s 
exports, which is the only measure that is available for a broad sample of countries. A typical example of such 
GVC participation is assembly of imported parts for exports. See section 3 of this paper for an extended discussion. 
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2. The roles of knowledge, capabilities and GVCs in economic 
development 
 
Today it is generally acknowledged that a very important source of differences in levels of 
economic development concerns differences in the command of knowledge (for an overview 
see Fagerberg and Srholec 2009). Moreover, it is increasingly recognized that much 
economically useful knowledge is difficult and costly to identify, access, acquire and exploit 
and that, for most if not all nations, foreign knowledge-bases are much larger than domestic 
ones. Hence the ability to tap into these foreign knowledge-bases becomes of utmost 
importance for the economic development of a nation. 
 
Several different channels for such knowledge transfer may be identified. Much knowledge, 
scientific knowledge for example, is in principle free, but that does not mean that it is easy to 
access and exploit. Above all it requires a high quality national education system, and a 
public and private R&D system that makes it possible to link up with advanced global 
research networks (Wagner and Leydesdorff 2005). Some advanced knowledge is proprietary 
and enterprises and governments can obtain access by paying for it, for instance, by licensing. 
Still, successfully exploiting the knowledge continues to be demanding and requires domestic 
engineering and design capabilities to succeed. FDI is another potential channel of 
knowledge transfer that may generate positive spillovers to domestic firms. Several studies of 
such spillovers demonstrate, however, that the benefits are conditional on developing 
sufficient indigenous capabilities on the receiving end (Bell and Marin 2004, Castellani and 
Zanfei 2006, Criscuolo and Narula 2008, Narula 2014). Participation in international trade, 
for example importing capital goods (Gomulka 1971), may also contribute to knowledge 
transfer. Finally, knowledge may be embodied in people, i.e., skilled workers and experts 
moving across national borders (Saxenian 2006). Sending students to obtain training abroad 
may be seen as one way to strengthen the domestic knowledge base. Common for these 
different channels of knowledge flows is that the effective use and diffusion of the knowledge 
absorbed will depend upon the strength of the national innovation system, e.g., its 
technological infrastructure, the skills of its labour force and firm-level capabilities 
(Fagerberg, Srholec and Verspagen 2010). 
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Participation in GVCs is a particular form of openness to trade in which knowledge transfer 
takes place in a more organized and interactive manner than in other forms of trade under the 
supervision of so-called “lead firms” governing the activities of the chain. Studies by GVC 
scholars have analysed how specific major multinational firms have organised production 
chains and how they have influenced formally independent firms operating as their preferred 
suppliers (Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark 2011).  Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon (2005) 
proposed five different modes of governance in global value chains: i) Hierarchy; ii) Captive; 
iii) Relational; iv) Modular; and v) Market. According to the authors, the further down we go 
on this list, the less dominating the lead firm. The dominance of the lead firm may be rooted 
in market control for a final product – such as when Walmart procures blue jeans from 
formally independent suppliers in Mexico (Gereffi 1999). Alternatively dominance may be 
rooted in technological capabilities – such as when Apple procures electronic components 
from formally independent producers in China (Linden et al 2009).  
 
Often case studies of participation in GVCs have revealed long term relationships and 
illustrated that the dominant firm under certain circumstances and to a certain degree will 
contribute to upgrading in the supplier firms (Gereffi 1999).4 Walmart needs good quality 
products adapted to market needs and Apple needs high quality components that are designed 
so that they fit into final products, including new product generations. However, the literature 
has also demonstrated that there are limits for the willingness of dominant firms to share 
knowledge and build capabilities among suppliers. A crucial issue is branding and market 
access. Walmart does not want the Mexican suppliers to become independent producers of a 
competing brand and Apple will only share technological knowledge that is not at the core of 
the business. Actually, we would expect the dominant firm to take all kinds of precautions to 
avoid that the supplier becomes a competitor (Humphrey and Schmitz 2000).   
 
Moreover, it is important to take into account that not all transactions in organized markets 
take place in GVCs dominated by multinationals and distributed worldwide. In fact, much of 
                                                 
4 Humphrey and Schmitz (2002) make a distinction between four forms of industrial upgrading: New process, 
New product, New function and New sector. While lead firms may have an interest in stimulating the development 
of new processes and products among suppliers they also might use their position in captive and relational forms 
of governance to block suppliers’ attempts to move into new functions (building strong internal R&D capability 
or establishing own brand). 
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the trade in intermediate goods takes place between enterprises located in high-income 
countries and within supranational regions (Europe, Asia and Africa) rather than between 
continents and sometimes regional trade agreements explain this kind of trade (Sturgeon 
2001). For example, the process of European integration was accompanied by a dramatic 
increase in this kind of trade. Such trade may of course involve long-term relationships 
between unequal partners, but it may also involve interaction between equal partners, and 
with suppliers in a quite strong position. Thus, the impact of GVC participation on the 
economy may differ a lot across different contexts.  
 
While firms in high- and middle-income countries with a strong industrial base and 
knowledge infrastructure may be in a position to benefit from participation in GVCs,5 it is not 
obvious that this holds to the same extent for firms located in low-income countries with a 
weak national innovation system. According to the literature on GVCs, the potential for 
upgrading will differ depending on the governance mode in the value chain, e.g., how 
dominating the lead firm is. Arguably, enterprises from countries with weak innovation 
systems may be expected to be predominantly operating in modes dominated by foreign 
multinational oligopolies (Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark 2011, Gereffi and Lee 2012). 
Therefore, it cannot be excluded that a major part of the economic value created goes to other 
parts of the value chain with more leverage (Linden et al 2009, Ali-Yrkkö, Rouvinen, 
Seppälä and Ylä-Anttila 2011). Nor is it obvious that the local economy in which the 
enterprise is located benefits.  
 
For example, a potential downside for the national economy might be that an enterprise 
joining a GVC, although advanced by local standards, decouples from interacting with 
domestic firms and thus undermines the potential for building dynamic national or regional 
clusters (Schmitz 1995 and 1999, Ponte and Ewert 2009). Activities that become offshored to 
developing countries tend to be low-value added and thus low-commitment, which means 
that they are footloose and not embedded in the local economy (Castellani and Zanfei 2006, 
Narula and Dunning 2010, Giroud and Mirza 2015). Furthermore, if the enterprise remains 
                                                 
5 For example, enterprises in countries such as Korea, Singapore and China have entered into international 
interactions as suppliers to multinationals in electronics and used the experience to move from being dependent 
suppliers to developing their own brands, ending up as important multinational enterprises (Lee 2013). 
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locked into narrow functions, the implications for the national economy may not be as 
favourable as policy makers would have wished, at least not in the longer run. Development 
effects ultimately depend on the value-added intensity of activities undertaken locally. 
Several studies indicate that strong local capabilities are required for deriving substantial 
benefits from joining GVC (Giuliani, Pietrobelli and Rabellotti 2005, Fu, Pietrobelli and 
Soete 2011). 
 
It is clear from the discussion that knowledge, including access to foreign sources of 
knowledge, is essential for economic development. However, it is also evident that there are 
several different channels for acquiring knowledge, that countries exploit these to a different 
extent and that the ability to do so depends on domestic capability-building. Therefore, to get 
a better grasp on the role of GVC participation in economic development, a broad framework 
including not only GVCs and other channels for knowledge transfer, but also domestic 
capability-building and other relevant factors, will be required. 
 
3. A preview of the data 
 
This section is concerned with the empirical operationalisation of the factors discussed above, 
as well as their relationships with economic development given by GDP per capita. All of the 
variables are measured in two points in time: initial and final periods, which refer to data 
from the nearest available year to 1997 and 2013, and whenever appropriate used in logs to 
limit the influence of outliers.6  Although the selected indicators have broad coverage, in 
some cases there were missing values that had to be dealt with (further details on definitions 
and sources can be found in Appendix A1).7 
 
                                                 
6 If necessary unity was added to avoid logs of zero. Unity was also added to variables with values very close to 
zero to avoid generating outliers with high negative values. The index of the quality of a country’s bureaucracy is 
not used in logs, as countries are ranked on a fixed five-points scale. 
7 Missing data were imputed (in particular about 16 % and 17 % of the sample for R&D expenditures and 
trademark applications, respectively) using the impute procedure in Stata 11.2 (for more information see Stata 
2005, pp. 217-221). The procedure, which is regression-based, uses information from other variables in the data 
set to fill in missing values. 
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As concerns capabilities, we take into account nine different indicators that together give a 
broad view on where a country stands with respect to the development of its national 
innovation system.8  The first four indicators reflect what Kim (1997) called “innovation 
capabilities”, i.e., the quality of a country’s science base (as measured by publications), R&D 
investments, patents and trademarks. The two next indicators on the list, namely ISO 
certification and internet users, are broader in character and may be seen as examples of what 
Kim (1997) labelled “production capabilities”. Finally, the set of indicators contains two 
measures referring to the educational level of the labour force and an index reflecting the 
quality of a country’s bureaucracy, both of which may be regarded as examples of what 
Abramovitz (1986) called “social capabilities”.   
 
For the purpose of the analysis the nine selected capability indicators are weighed together 
into a composite measure using factor analysis (for detailed results see Appendix A2).  As 
shown by the factor loadings the various capability indicators are closely correlated, giving 
strong empirical support to the use of a composite measure. Figure 1 plots the resulting 
capability measure against GDP per capita. The regression line between the two variables is 
also reported. As might be expected GDP per capita is an increasing function of a country’s 
capability-level.  Poor countries generally have low capabilities. Furthermore, resource-rich 
countries tend in some cases to have far higher GDP per capita than their capability levels 
would indicate. 
 
                                                 
8 The capability-indicators taken into account below strongly resemble those included in the “innovation system” 
measure proposed by Fagerberg and Srholec (2008) based on a similar methodology as the one applied here. 
However, their study also contained a rich set of indicators on governance and institutions, which factored out in 
separate dimensions.  
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Figure 1: GDP per capita and Capabilities, average 1997 and 2013  
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development. Following Koopman et al (2010 and 2014), a country’s gross exports can be 
split up into a part capturing domestically produced value added and a part capturing 
imported value added that is incorporated into the country’s exports. The latter has become 
commonly used as an indicator for the extent of downstream GVC participation, such as 
assembly of foreign-produced parts for exports. In this study this indicator is called GVC 
imports. The same indicator has also been dubbed “backward-linkage indicator” (Kummritz 
and Quast 2016) or simply “foreign value added in exports” (Koopman et al 2014, Timmer et 
al 2014 and Foster‐McGregor, et al 2015).9 
                                                 
9 For caveats of using input-output tables for measuring the participation in GVCs see Nomaler and Verspagen 
(2014). 
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Until recently trade statistics were only available in terms of gross exports and imports, hence 
reflecting sales, not value added, and thus becoming increasingly biased due to the spread of 
GVCs. Nevertheless, international organizations, including UNCTAD and OECD, have put 
great effort to trace how intermediate products move between countries using detailed data on 
international transactions recorded in input-output tables, resulting in the Eora multi-region 
input-output table (MRIO) database (Eora 2016). More specifically, the GVC imports 
indicator used in this study is derived from the Trade In Value Added (TiVA) database 
(UNCTAD/Eora 2016), which is based on the MRIO dataset and provides evidence from 189 
countries, including many developing nations.10 For more detailed explanation of the 
database and calculation of the GVC imports indicator see UNCTAD (2013, pp. 26-29).  
 
A country’s exports does not consist of final goods only, but also of inputs for further 
processing and exports by other countries. Koopman et al (2011 and 2014) refer to this 
indicator of upstream GVC participation as “indirect value-added exports”. It has been also 
interpreted as “forward-linkage indicator” (Kummritz and Quast 2016) or “the extent of GVC 
participation for relatively upstream sectors” (Foster‐McGregor et al. (2015). However, this 
indicator is not included in the TiVA database (UNCTAD/Eora 2016) that we are using. 
Moreover, for developing countries this indicator primarily reflects their traditional roles as 
exporters of commodities, that has been extensively analysed elsewhere (see, e.g., Morris, 
Kaplinsky and Kaplan 2012, Fitter and Kaplinsky 2001 and Narula 2018), and which, 
although interesting, is not the central focus of this paper.  
 
Figure 2 plots the extent of GVC imports against GDP per capita. The figure reveals that this 
form of participation in GVCs is not as closely correlated with economic development as 
capabilities are (Figure 1).  In fact, there is a lot of variation across countries at similar levels 
of development, and the degree of variation appears to increase as countries get richer. 
 
                                                 
10 Other database with multi-country input-output tables that can be used to compute GVC imports is the World 
Input–Output Database (WIOD) (Timmer et al. 2015), which, however, provides evidence only on 43 
predominantly advanced countries. 
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Figure 2: GDP per capita and GVC imports, average 1997 and 2013  
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4. Does it matter? 
 
Arguably, the level of economic development may be seen as the result of a process in which 
not just one but several channels for knowledge transfer interact with other national and 
international factors. Moreover, knowledge-based growth is not only about exploiting foreign 
knowledge, because domestic knowledge creation and the national innovation system matter 
too. Finally, economic development may also be influenced by factors that have little to do 
with knowledge such as abundance of natural resources. To take all these factors into account 
this section turns to multivariate regression analysis.  
 
The purpose of the analysis that follows is to test whether increased GVC participation 
measured by the indicator of GVC imports is associated with higher economic growth, when 
the possible influence of other relevant factors is accounted for (so-called “conditioning 
factors”).  However, it should be noted that the cross-sectional nature of the data does not 
allow for testing of causality or the impact of possible country-specific factors, and that the 
results should therefore be interpreted with caution.  
 
To analyse this issue, we employ a so-called conditional growth regression (Cornwall 1976, 
Barro 1991):  
(1) y = a0 + a1Y + a2O +a2o + a3C + a4c +a5F,  
where the dependent variable is growth of GDP per capita. Y refers to the initial level of GDP 
per capita. O/o represent the initial level/growth of various channels for transfer of foreign 
knowledge. As mentioned above, in addition to GVC imports we also include capital goods 
imports, inward FDI and tertiary students abroad. C/c is the initial level/growth of relevant 
capabilities (as described in the previous section) and F represents other exogenous factors 
controlled for to reduce the possible omitted variable bias. The control variables taken into 
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account here reflect differences in country size,11 industrial structure, disease ecology and 
nature. All variables are in logs, as already noted above, thus growth refers to log difference 
(a log approximation of the growth rate). The sample includes 125 countries between 1997 
and 2013 (descriptive statistics on the variables that enter the regression analysis is provided 
in Appendix A3 and the list of countries is in Appendix A4). 
 
The inclusion of the initial level of GDP per capita among the explanatory factors reflects the 
classical “catch-up” or “latecomer” hypothesis advanced by economic historians such as 
Gerschenkron (1962) and Abramovitz (1986), i.e., that low-income countries far from the 
technology frontier have a larger scope to benefit from international knowledge spillovers 
than countries close to the frontier. Thus, the estimated impact of this variable should be 
expected to be negative, indicating slower growth for countries close to the frontier.  
 
The results are reported in Table 1. OLS robust to outliers is used in the estimates based on 
the procedure suggested by Li (1985). Beta coefficients are reported, i.e. the variables enter 
the analysis standardized with mean of zero and standard deviation of one, thus the estimated 
coefficients refer to the impact of change by one standard deviation. The first column in 
Table 1 reports estimates of the model without controls, while in the second column the 
control variables are added. However, since the estimates for some of the variables were not 
statistically significant, a backward search for the best model was conducted, using a 20% 
significance level as criterion for exclusion/re-inclusion in the model, the results of which are 
reported in the third column.  
 
                                                 
11 Size, represented by population, is pertinent to control for, as firms in large countries naturally engage more 
with domestic customers, suppliers and investors than do firms in smaller economies. 
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Table 1: Explaining growth of GDP per capita: Regression results, iteratively re-weighted 
least squares, 1997-2013 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
GDP per capita -1.03*** -1.12*** -1.00*** 
 (8.34) (5.40) (8.52) 
Capabilities 0.87*** 0.61*** 0.62*** 
 (6.15) (3.38) (4.14) 
 capabilities 0.41*** 0.29*** 0.27*** 
 (5.50) (3.48) (3.47) 
GVC imports  -0.15 -0.17 -0.15 
 (1.37) (1.57) (1.48) 
 GVC imports -0.23*** -0.22*** -0.20*** 
 (3.41) (3.15) (3.43) 
Capital goods imports 0.19** 0.30*** 0.28*** 
 (2.02) (2.72) (3.01) 
 capital goods imports 0.05 0.07 .. 
 (0.63) (0.88)  
FDI inward 0.02 0.03 .. 
 (0.24) (0.34)  
  FDI inward  -0.05 -0.04 .. 
 (0.63) (0.45)  
Outbound mobility of tertiary students -0.06 0.05 .. 
 (0.71) (0.51)  
 outbound mobility of tertiary students 0.21*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 
 (3.13) (3.38) (3.49) 
Control variables:    
Size (population) .. 0.16 0.15* 
  (1.65) (1.94) 
Agriculture .. -0.12 .. 
  (0.79)  
Natural resources rents .. -0.02 .. 
  (0.22)  
Tropics .. 0.03 .. 
  (0.33)  
Malaria .. -0.27*** -0.24*** 
  (2.82) (2.95) 
F-test 12.96*** 9.92*** 18.01*** 
R2 0.44 0.47 0.45 
Number of observations 125 125 125 
 
Note: The dependent variable is log difference of GDP per capita (PPP, constant 2011 international USD) divided 
by the number of years (a log approximation of the annual growth rate). Absolute value of robust t-statistics in 
parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent levels. Beta coefficients reported. 
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The results suggest that capabilities, whether measured by the initial level or subsequent 
growth, have a strong, positive relationship with growth of GDP per capita, and the estimated 
relation is quite robust with respect to changes in specification. However, only two of the 
eight variables for channels of knowledge transfer included in the test can be shown to be 
positively correlated with economic growth, namely capital goods imports (initial level) and 
sending tertiary students abroad (growth). The estimates indicate that countries that increase 
GVC imports tend to grow more slowly than other countries, when a number of other 
relevant factors are controlled for. Nevertheless, as already noted, these results do not provide 
information on the direction of causality.  
 
It is possible, however, that this estimate, which is for all countries in the sample, masks quite 
different relationships for subgroups of countries with common characteristics, such as 
development level and size. The relatively small sample does not allow for extensive testing 
of this possibility. Nevertheless, to throw some light on this issue we report in Table 2 a test 
for the parameter stability across groups of countries by adding to the model dummy 
variables for membership in the various groups and allowing for their interactions with the 
increase of GVC imports. All other variables remain the same (third column of Table 1). The 
dimensions taken into account are income level (as defined by the World Bank), development 
level (as defined by the IMF), initial capability level (as derived from the factor analysis), 
geography (continents) and country size (population).12 The base category is low-income 
countries in the World Bank classification, developing countries in the IMF case, low-
capability countries according to the factor score, African countries in the version with 
continents and small countries when it comes to size. Along all five dimensions, there are 
                                                 
12 Countries are assigned to income level groups according to their classification in 1997 by the World Bank 
(2015) and to development level groups following the classification used by the IMF (1997). Based on the 
capabilities index in the initial period, as derived from the factor analysis (Table 1), countries are assigned to three 
groups as follows: i) Low capabilities with the index more than one standard deviation below the mean (15 
countries); ii) Medium capabilities with the index within the range of one standard deviation below and above the 
mean (85 countries); and iii) High capabilities with the index more than one standard deviation above the mean 
(25 countries). The results are qualitatively similar, if the Medium capabilities group is split into Medium-low (58 
counties) and Medium-high (27 countries) depending on whether the index is below or above the mean, 
respectively. Countries are assigned to a continent, where resides most of the population. Size groups are defined 
in terms of the initial population reported by the World Bank (2016) as follows: i) Small size with less than 5 mil 
(40 countries); ii) Medium size with 5 to 20 mil. (45 countries); and iii) Large size with more than 20 mil. (40 
countries).  
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indications of parameter variability, although often not statistically significant at conventional 
levels. The strongest support for parameter variation is for large and medium-sized 
economies, countries that are classified as advanced by the IMF and countries with high 
capabilities. For these country groups the estimated relationship between increased GVC 
imports and economic growth (i.e., the sum of the estimated coefficient for the base category 
and the interaction dummy) is close to zero. 
 
The interpretation of these findings is plain. For advanced countries with well-developed 
capabilities it does not matter much whether they participate in GVCs a little more or a little 
less. Hence, it appears that when they participate in GVCs, they tend to have sufficient 
leverage to get their fair share of the economic benefits. This does not hold for countries 
without such capabilities, however, and not for very small countries either. A possible 
explanation, then, consistent with the literature on GVCs, would be that firms in these 
countries have little leverage when it comes to decisions on how to share the economic 
benefits from the value added created in the GVCs.  
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Table 2: Testing for differences in the impact of increased GVC imports across country 
groups  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Income 
level 
(World 
Bank) 
Developm
ent level 
(IMF) 
Capabiliti
es level 
(Factor 
analysis) 
Geograph
y 
(Continen
ts) 
Size 
(Populatio
n) 
 GVC imports -0.31*** -0.28*** -0.32** -0.35*** -0.42*** 
 (3.55) (3.77) (2.02) (3.20) (3.81) 
 GVC imports x Medium income 0.12 .. .. .. .. 
 (0.89)     
 GVC imports x High income 0.18 .. .. .. .. 
 (1.34)     
 GVC imports x Transition .. -0.04 .. .. .. 
  (0.24)    
 GVC imports x Advanced .. 0.30** .. .. .. 
  (2.02)    
 GVC imports x Medium capabilities .. .. 0.05 .. .. 
   (0.32)   
 GVC imports x High capabilities .. .. 0.34* .. .. 
   (1.72)   
 GVC imports x Asia and Oceania .. .. .. 0.22 .. 
    (1.49)  
 GVC imports x America .. .. .. 0.23 .. 
    (1.14)  
 GVC imports x Europe .. .. .. 0.27 .. 
    (1.60)  
 GVC imports x Medium size .. .. .. .. 0.28* 
     (1.87) 
 GVC imports x Large size .. .. .. .. 0.33** 
     (2.25) 
 
Note: The dependent variable is log difference of GDP per capita (PPP, constant 2011 international USD) divided 
by the number of years (a log approximation of the annual growth rate). All other variables remain the same as in 
the third column of Table 1, i.e. in the preferred model, except that the group dummies are added to the regression. 
Absolute value of robust t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent levels. 
Beta coefficient of  GVC imports reported. 
 
Thus, the results suggest that countries with less-well developed capabilities actually lose 
from taking more active part in GVCs, but that this does not hold for countries higher up on 
the capability ladder. An interesting question, then, is at what level of capabilities does GVC 
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participation starts to make more sense economically.13 Figure 3 provides a take on this issue. 
The figure shows (from left to right) how the estimate of an interaction term between the 
increase of GVC imports and a country-dummy (when countries are ranked by the initial 
capability level) changes as the number of countries covered by the dummy becomes 
gradually smaller (i.e., increasingly limited to high capability countries).  For example, 75 on 
the horizontal axis indicates that a dummy for the top 75 countries in terms of capabilities is 
used in the estimate, etc. The results show that the sample divides in two parts at a medium 
level of capabilities. For the more capable countries, starting from a level close to the poorest 
member countries of the European Union (Bulgaria and Romania, for example) or the more 
advanced countries in Latin-America (such as Argentina, Chile or Uruguay), the relationship 
between increased GVC imports and economic growth (the sum of the baseline and the 
interaction term) edges up slightly above zero. However, for less capable countries the 
relationship remains clearly negative.  
 
                                                 
13 We wish to thank one of the editors of this journal for proposing this question. 
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Figure 3: The impact of increased GVC imports at different capability levels - an 
explorative analysis 
 
  
 
Note: The baseline is the estimated beta coefficient of  GVC imports. Interaction is the estimated coefficient of 
an interaction term between  GVC imports and a dummy variable for countries with capabilities exceeding a 
certain threshold level. Total is the sum of the baseline coefficient and the interaction term. All other variables 
remain the same as in the third column of Table 1. Smoothed values (the lines) are derived from kernel-
weighted local polynomial smoothing (using Epanechnikov kernel function). 
 
As pointed out above, cross-sectional data is not well suited for analyses of the direction of 
causality. For example, while - as pointed out earlier - the usual assumption is that 
participation in GVCs affects economic growth, an effect in the opposite direction may not be 
ruled out. While interesting, this is not an issue that can be explored with the available data.  
Such problems may also be relevant for some of the other indicators. We tested the 
robustness of the results with regards to removing the growth of capital goods imports and 
outbound mobility of tertiary students from the preferred model (Table 1, third column), 
however, the main conclusions, including with respect to parameter stability, did not change. 
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14  Furthermore, multi-collinearity may be a problem in small, cross sectional data sets. A 
particular concern might be the correlation between GDP per capita and capabilities (see 
Figure 1 and Appendix A5 for details). Nevertheless, both variables come out with 
statistically highly significant coefficients and results of the variance inflation factors (VIFs) 
test confirm that there is not a serious collinearity problem.15  
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
In the 1980s international organizations such as the IMF and World Bank forged the so-called 
Washington Consensus which emphasized openness to trade and FDI and a hands-off 
approach with respect to markets as essential ingredients for development. The consensus 
soon started to crack however, as research indicated that the empirical support for the 
underlying assumptions was far from robust (Rodrik 1994, Chang 2002, Fagerberg and 
Godinho 2004).  
 
From the 1990s onwards, a sizeable literature has emerged on the increasing role played by 
GVCs, coordinated by multinational companies, in the world economy, and the possibilities 
that participation in such chains may entail for firms in developing countries. As pointed out 
in the introduction to this paper, the very same international organizations that were behind 
the now defunct Washington Consensus now actively promote participation in such chains as 
a way forward for development. The question arises if this is just old wine in a new bottle, or 
if it represents a decisive new turn in the process of global economic development with 
significant new opportunities for low-income countries to escape the poverty trap.  This paper 
has attempted to throw new light on the issue, using a framework that also takes into account 
other factors that may be of importance for growth and development, and data for a broad 
sample including many low-income countries. Having an extensive country coverage is 
                                                 
14 Results of these additional tests are available on request. 
15 In the preferred specification (Table 2, third column), mean VIF = 2.91 for the whole model and maximum VIF 
= 7.18 for the most correlated single variable. For more details on the VIF test see estat vif command in Stata 
(2017, pp. 2276-2280). 
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essential for producing reliable evidence on the matter, but the cross-sectional nature of the 
available data means that the analysis presented in this paper is explorative.  
 
It is certainly true, as shown by e.g., Kummritz and Quast (2016) that participation in GVCs 
has increased steadily over the last decades.16 However, as pointed out in section 2, positive 
effects for all participating countries cannot be taken for granted, because it cannot be 
excluded that most of the benefits go to the multinationals that coordinate the chains, and that 
spillovers in the context of developing countries, being pecuniary or technological in nature, 
are small and possibly less than they would have been had the human and other resources 
been devoted to something else. The results of this paper suggest that in general countries 
gain little if at all in terms of economic growth from increasing their participation in GVCs 
measured by foreign value added in exports. Moreover, the analysis suggests that countries 
with less-well developed capabilities –  about half of the sample analysed here – that increase 
this form of participation in GVCs perform worse economically than other countries with 
similar characteristics. The same applies for very small countries. Unfortunately, there are not 
many other studies that the results presented here can be compared to. But it is noteworthy 
that Kummritz (2015), using different methods and a smaller sample of countries, also finds 
that low-income countries do not benefit economically from participating in GVCs.17  
 
Nevertheless, the results presented here confirm, in line with other research (Fagerberg and 
Srholec 2008, 2017), that there is a strong link between developing technological and social 
capability and economic development. Furthermore, the results suggest that building the 
innovation system is not only important for economic development more generally, but also 
for the possibility to benefit from GVC participation. So placing emphasis on improving such 
factors, i.e., developing the national innovation system, appears to be a fruitful direction for 
policy. How to do that is a challenging issue that we cannot address in the necessary detail in 
the present paper. As emphasized in the literature on national innovation systems, specific 
                                                 
16 Whether this also should be expected to hold in the future is another matter, that we cannot pursue here. See   
IRC Trade Task Force (2016) for an interesting take on this issue. 
17 Tajoli and Felice (2018) present estimates of a knowledge production function with patenting as dependent 
variable and R&D spillovers transmitted through GVC participation among the independent variables. Patenting 
is well known to be a problematic indicator in a developing country context (Fagerberg, Srholec and Verspagen 
2010). Nevertheless, they conclude that GVC participation plays a positive role for knowledge transmission, and 
that this holds also for developing countries. However, their sample include very few developing countries, and 
not s single low-income country (as classified by the World Bank) or country from Africa.  
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policy recommendations need to be based upon deep insight in the unique characteristics of 
the national innovation system (Lundvall et al 2009).  Moreover, the different dimensions 
included in the capability measure employed here might warrant separate attention, as they 
may be of different importance in countries at different levels of development (Cirera and 
Maloney 2017).   
  
Several issues raised in this paper merit more research. Better data and longer time series may 
allow for more elaborate tests, particularly with respect to causality, than those employed in 
this paper. The time period taken into account here is relatively short and includes a major 
global economic crisis. It cannot be excluded that this has influenced the results. There may 
also be long lags in cause-effect relationships that would be easier to detect if longer time 
series had been available. Moreover, as also suggested in other recent research (Narula 2018, 
Pietrobelli and Staritz 2018), the questions concerning the role of - and interaction between - 
building the innovation system and different forms of openness in the process of economic 
development certainly deserve more attention. Finally, the GVC measure used here is derived 
from national accounting and does as such not discriminate between different types of 
governance of the value chains, which remains a challenge for future research (Altenburg 
2006, Kaplinsky and Morris 2015). 
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Appendix A1: Definitions and sources of the variables 
Indicator & definition Scaling Source 
Estimated 
observa-
tions 
GDP per capita: Gross domestic product converted to constant 2011 international 
dollars using purchasing power parity rates. 
USD per capita World Bank (2016) 0 
Scientific and engineering articles: Counts of citable documents recorded in 
SCImago Journal & Country Rank (based on information contained in the Scopus 
database). 
per mil. people SCImago (2016) 0 
USPTO patent applications: Counts of applications for utility patens filed in the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) classified by country of residence 
of the first named inventor.  
per mil. people USPTO (2016) 0 
R&D expenditures: Intramural expenditure on research and experimental 
development (R&D) performed on the national territory. 
% of GDP 
UNESCO (2016), OECD (2016), Castellacci 
and Natera, (2011) and national sources 
39 
Trademark applications: Counts of applications for registration of trademarks 
filed by residents directly and via the Madrid system. 
per mil. people WIPO (2016) 43 
ISO 9001 certifications: Counts of ISO 9001 management system standard 
certifications. 
per mil. people ISO (2014) 0 
Internet users: Internet users are individuals who have used the Internet (from any 
location) in the last 12 months. 
per 100 people World Bank (2016) 0 
Mean years of schooling: Average number of years of education received by people 
ages 25 and older, converted from education attainment levels using official durations of 
each level. 
years UNDP (2016)  0 
Adult literacy: People aged 15 and over who can read , understand and write a short, 
simple statement on their everyday life. 
% of adult 
population 
UNDP (2016) and World Bank (2016) 2 
Bureaucracy quality: An assessment of the institutional strength and quality of the 
bureaucracy, which represents a shock absorber that tends to limit revisions of policy 
when governments change. 
index PRS Group (2014) 10 
GVC imports: Imported inputs (produced in other countries) accounted in the gross 
exports of a country derived from input-output tables. 
% of GDP UNCTAD/Eora (2016) 0 
Capital goods imports: Imports of capital goods (BEC, rev. 3 categories 41, 51 and 
52) derived from trade in goods statistics. 
% of GDP UN (2016) 7 
FDI inward: The value of capital and reserves (including retained profits) attributable % of GDP UNCTAD (2016) 0 
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to foreign parent enterprises with lasting management interest, plus the net indebtedness 
of foreign affiliates to the parent enterprises. 
Outbound mobility of tertiary students: Gross outbound tertiary enrolment 
ratio given by the number of tertiary students from a given country studying in North 
America and Western Europe expressed as the percentage of the population of tertiary 
age in that country. 
Gross enrolment in 
% 
UNCTAD (2016) 8 
Size (population): All residents regardless of legal status or citizenship (except for 
refugees not permanently settled in the country of asylum) who are generally considered 
part of the population of their country of origin. 
people  World Bank (2016) 0 
Agriculture: Agriculture corresponds to ISIC divisions 1-5 and includes forestry, 
hunting, and fishing, as well as cultivation of crops and livestock production. 
% of GDP World Bank (2016) 0 
Natural resources rents: The sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents (hard 
and soft), mineral rents, and forest rents. 
% of GDP World Bank (2016) 0 
Tropics: Proportion of land area in Koeppen-Geiger tropics. share Gallup et al. (1999) 0 
Malaria ecology: Stability of malaria transmission given by biologic characteristics 
of vector mosquitoes. 
index Kiszewski et al. (2004) 0 
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Appendix A2: Capabilities: Results of the factor analysis 
 Factor loadings 
Scientific and engineering articles (per capita) 0.94 
USPTO patent applications (per capita) 0.87 
R&D expenditures (% of GDP) 0.79 
Trademark applications (per capita) 0.76 
ISO 9001 certifications (per capita) 0.91 
Internet users (per capita) 0.70 
Years of schooling (years) 0.80 
Adult literacy (% of adult population) 0.68 
Bureaucracy quality (index) 0.76 
 
Note: The extraction method is principal factors; based on pooled data in 125 countries in 1997 and 2013, hence 
250 observations in total; only one factor with eigenvalue > 1.00 was detected; 0.65 proportion of eigenvalues 
accounted for by the first factor using the trace of the correlation matrix as the divisor.  
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Appendix A3: Descriptive statistics 
 
  Mean St. dev. Min Max 
 GDP per capita 0.024 0.020 -0.036 0.097 
GDP per capita 9.071 1.243 6.195 11.609 
Capabilities -0.286 0.950 -2.222 1.520 
 capabilities 0.036 0.014 0.009 0.081 
GVC imports  1.657 0.872 0.284 3.967 
 GVC imports 0.024 0.023 -0.039 0.089 
Capital goods imports 1.955 0.457 0.701 3.280 
 capital goods imports 0.003 0.025 -0.072 0.076 
FDI inward 2.665 0.834 0.486 5.128 
  FDI inward 0.061 0.054 -0.069 0.272 
Outbound mobility of tertiary students 0.542 0.594 0.019 3.294 
 outbound mobility of tertiary students 0.010 0.018 -0.020 0.088 
Size (population) 16.217 1.559 12.510 20.930 
Agriculture 2.318 0.975 0.086 4.073 
Natural resources rents 1.506 1.129 0.000 3.807 
Tropics 1.566 2.020 0.000 4.615 
Malaria 0.684 1.016 0.000 3.483 
 
Note: All variables are in logs,   refers to log difference divided by the number of years (a log approximation of 
the annual growth rate). 
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Appendix A4: List of countries (alphabetically) 
 
Albania Cyprus Iran Morocco Slovenia 
Algeria Czech Rep. Ireland Mozambique South Africa 
Argentina Cote d'Ivoire Israel Namibia Spain 
Armenia Denmark Italy Netherlands Sri Lanka 
Australia Dominican Rep. Jamaica New Zealand Sweden 
Austria Ecuador Japan Nicaragua Switzerland 
Azerbaijan Egypt Jordan Niger Taiwan 
Bahrain El Salvador Kazakhstan Nigeria Tajikistan 
Bangladesh Estonia Kenya Norway Tanzania 
Belarus Ethiopia Korea Oman Thailand 
Belgium Finland Kuwait Pakistan Togo 
Bolivia France Kyrgyzstan Panama Trinidad and Tobago 
Botswana Gabon Latvia Papua New Guinea Tunisia 
Brazil Georgia Lebanon Paraguay Turkey 
Brunei Darussalam Germany Lithuania Peru Uganda 
Bulgaria Ghana Luxembourg Philippines Ukraine 
Burkina Faso Greece Macedonia Poland United Arab Emirates 
Cambodia Guatemala Madagascar Portugal United Kingdom 
Cameroon Guinea Malawi Qatar United States 
Canada Honduras Malaysia Romania Uruguay 
Chile Hong Kong Mali Russia Venezuela 
China Hungary Malta Saudi Arabia Vietnam 
Colombia Iceland Mexico Senegal Yemen 
Costa Rica India Moldova Singapore Zambia 
Croatia Indonesia Mongolia Slovakia Zimbabwe 
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Appendix A5: Correlation table 
  
 
GDP 
per 
capita 
GDP 
per 
capita 
Capab
ilities 
 
capabi
lities 
GVC 
impor
ts  
 
GVC 
impor
ts 
Capita
l 
goods 
impor
ts 
 
capita
l 
goods 
impor
ts 
FDI 
inwar
d 
  FDI 
inwar
d 
Outbo
und 
mobili
ty of 
tertiar
y 
studen
ts 
 
outbo
und 
mobili
ty of 
tertiar
y 
studen
ts 
Size 
(popul
ation) 
Agric
ulture 
Natur
al 
resour
ces 
rents 
Tropi
cs 
Malar
ia 
 GDP per capita 1.00                 
GDP per capita -0.37 1.00                
Capabilities -0.16 0.83 1.00               
 capabilities 0.34 0.05 -0.15 1.00              
GVC imports  0.06 0.50 0.63 0.08 1.00             
 GVC imports -0.13 0.06 0.14 0.00 -0.02 1.00            
Capital goods imports -0.02 0.28 0.26 0.00 0.63 0.00 1.00           
 capital goods 
imports 0.08 -0.36 -0.28 -0.03 -0.27 0.30 -0.42 1.00          
FDI inward 0.05 0.16 0.16 -0.09 0.39 -0.04 0.47 -0.20 1.00         
  FDI inward -0.02 0.04 0.10 0.16 0.10 0.25 0.06 0.09 -0.47 1.00        
Outbound mobility of 
tertiary students -0.28 0.64 0.56 0.03 0.43 0.13 0.41 -0.45 0.22 0.22 1.00       
 outbound mobility 
of tertiary students 0.36 0.03 0.04 0.40 0.19 0.11 0.10 0.08 -0.04 0.24 0.02 1.00      
Size (population) 0.18 -0.25 -0.11 0.06 -0.25 -0.08 -0.59 0.21 -0.24 -0.25 -0.52 -0.17 1.00     
Agriculture 0.36 -0.92 -0.79 0.04 -0.49 -0.08 -0.30 0.31 -0.23 -0.03 -0.60 0.03 0.22 1.00    
Natural resources 
rents -0.06 -0.27 -0.57 0.05 -0.42 -0.34 -0.11 0.09 -0.03 -0.28 -0.31 -0.07 0.01 0.30 1.00   
Tropics -0.01 -0.42 -0.48 -0.11 -0.26 -0.15 0.00 -0.09 0.02 -0.16 -0.29 -0.21 0.14 0.38 0.32 1.00  
Malaria -0.13 -0.59 -0.61 -0.26 -0.37 -0.05 -0.05 0.16 0.05 -0.14 -0.28 -0.22 0.08 0.46 0.39 0.59 1.00 
 
